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Abstract
Banks increasingly use short-term wholesale funds to supplement traditional re-
tail deposits. Existing literature mainly points to the "bright side" of wholesale
funding: sophisticated ￿nanciers can monitor banks, disciplining bad but re￿nanc-
ing good ones. This paper models a "dark side" of wholesale funding. In an envi-
ronment with a costless but noisy public signal on bank project quality, short-term
wholesale ￿nanciers have lower incentives to conduct costly monitoring, and instead
may withdraw based on negative public signals, triggering ine¢ cient liquidations.
Comparative statics suggest that such distortions of incentives are smaller when
public signals are less relevant and project liquidation costs are higher, e.g., when
banks hold mostly relationship-based small business loans.
JEL Classi￿cation: G21, G28, G33
Keywords: Financial Crises, Liquidity Risk, Wholesale Funding, Regulation5
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Banks increasingly use short-term wholesale funds to supplement retail deposits. 
Through wholesale money markets, they attract cash surpluses from nonfinancial 
corporations, households (via money market mutual funds), other financial institutions, 
foreign entities, etc. How should this shift in the funding structure affect bank performance 
and stability? 
The existing banking literature has so far mainly pointed to the "bright side" of 
wholesale funding: exploiting valuable investment opportunities without being constrained 
by the local deposit supply, the ability of the providers of wholesale funds to provide market 
discipline and to refinance unexpected retail withdrawals. However, these benefits were 
clearly not realized in the recent mortgage banking crisis. Indeed, the crisis demonstrated 
how banks can use wholesale funds to aggressively expand lending and compromise credit 
quality, particularly when financiers exercise insufficient market discipline. Later, at the 
refinancing stage, there is a risk that the providers of wholesale funds abruptly withdraw 
upon a hint of negative news, triggering inefficient liquidations. 
This paper attempts to reconcile the traditional view on the virtues of wholesale 
funding with its potentially negative effects. The key insight we suggest is that wholesale 
funding is beneficial when informed, but may lead to inefficient liquidations when 
uninformed. We study the incentives of the providers of wholesale funds to become 
informed, the choices of uninformed providers of wholesale funds of whether to refinance or 
liquidate of a bank, and bank choices of whether to use short-term (and potentially 
uninformed) wholesale funding. 
In the key result of the paper, we show that the incentives of wholesale financiers to 
monitor banks and impose market discipline can become distorted in the presence of a free 
but noisy public signals on bank project quality. Examples of such signals include market 
prices or credit ratings for traded assets (e.g., mortgage-backed securities), performance of 
other similar banks, or various market- or sector-wide indicators (e.g., house or energy 
prices). We show that the presence of such a signal: 
  Lowers the incentives of the providers of wholesale funds to monitor banks; 6
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 Gives the providers of wholesale funds excess incentives to liquidate banks based 
on noisy public information; 
 Importantly, these distortions become stronger when the providers of wholesale 
funds are more senior claimants to the liquidated assets – representing the cases of 
short-term and/or collateralized funding. 
These distortions also become stronger when public signal on bank quality become 
more precise (but not too precise). The availability of relevant public information likely 
depends on the type of assets that the bank holds. For example, while the market prices of 
mortgage-backed securities (MBS) or house price changes can shed light on the 
fundamentals of a typical mortgage bank, few similarly relevant public signals exist for 
traditional banks that hold mainly relationship-based small business loans. The signal 
precision can also be interpreted as the correlation between an individual bank's 
fundamentals with system-wide outcomes or indicators. With the proliferation of "risk 
transfer" and "risk dispersion" mechanisms, individual bank performances have become 
increasingly correlated, so that public signals now provide more relevant information on an 
individual bank's performance. 
In a bank cross-section, our results suggest that the use of senior short-term funds is 
likely to be beneficial in "traditional" banks that hold mainly opaque and nontradable 
relationship loans, consistent with the traditional "bright side" view on sophisticated 
wholesale funding. Yet the "dark side" negative effects of wholesale funding are likely to 
play a significant role in banks with large exposures to standardized and tradable arm's length 
assets with readily available public information, particularly when the providers of wholesale 
funds are senior claimants. 7
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1 Introduction
Banks increasingly borrow short-term wholesale funds to supplement retail deposits
(Feldman and Schmidt, 2001). Through wholesale money markets, they attract cash
surpluses from non￿nancial corporations, households (via money market mutual funds),
other ￿nancial institutions, etc. Wholesale funds are usually raised on a short-term
rollover basis with instruments such as large-denomination certi￿cates of deposits, bro-
kered deposits, repurchase agreements, Fed funds, and commercial paper.
The existing literature mainly points to the "bright side" of wholesale funding: ex-
ploiting valuable investment opportunities without being constrained by the local deposit
supply, the ability of wholesale ￿nanciers to provide market discipline (Calomiris, 1999)
and to re￿nance unexpected retail withdrawals (Goodfriend and King, 1998). However,
some of these bene￿ts were not realized in the recent mortgage banking crisis (Acharya
et al., 2008; Huang and Ratnovski, 2009). Indeed, the crisis demonstrated how banks
can use wholesale funds to aggressively expand lending and compromise credit quality,
particularly when ￿nanciers exercise insu¢ cient market discipline. Later, at the re￿-
nancing stage, there is a risk that wholesale ￿nanciers abruptly withdraw upon a hint
of negative news, triggering ine¢ cient liquidations.
This paper attempts to reconcile the traditional view on the virtues of wholesale
funding with its potentially negative e⁄ects. The key insight we suggest is that whole-
sale funding is bene￿cial when informed, but may lead to ine¢ cient liquidations when
uninformed. Formally, we consider a bank that ￿nances a risky long-term project with
two sources of funds: retail deposits and wholesale funds. Retail deposits are sluggish,
insensitive to risks (partly because they are insured), and provide a stable source of
long-term funding.1 Wholesale funds are relatively sophisticated, since their providers
1The "sluggishness" of retail deposits is a well-established stylized fact (Feldman and Schmidt, 2001;
Song and Thakor, 2007). Retail deposits are typically insured by the government. Their withdrawals
are motivated mostly by individual depositors￿liquidity needs and thus are predictable based on the
law of large numbers. Another reason for the "sluggishness" is the high switching costs associated with
transaction services that retail depositors receive from banks (Kim et al., 2003; Sharpe, 1990, 1997).
As a result, although some accounts are formally demandable, retail deposits provide a relatively stable
source of long-term funds for banks. However, the local retail deposit base is quasi-￿xed in size, since it is
usually prohibitively expensive to expand it in the medium term (Billett and Gar￿nkel, 2004; Flannery,8
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seniority can reduce monitoring and encourage ine¢ cient liquidations. Social welfare
is constrained-maximized for an intermediate level of seniority, which depends on the
bank￿ s funding structure (i.e., share of passive retail deposits on the liability side), the
precision of public signals on bank project quality (which often depends on the type
of assets held), liquidation value of bank assets, and interest rates o⁄ered to wholesale
￿nanciers. This is a novel result that usefully contrasts with CK and bears close resem-
blance to recent developments in the credit market, as well as some earlier instances of
bank failures. It reveals the "dark" side of short-term wholesale funding.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets up the benchmark
CK-type model of the "bright side" of wholesale bank funding. Section 3 introduces
the costless but noisy signal on bank project quality and analyzes the "dark side" of
wholesale funding. Section 4 discusses some features of our model and brie￿ y outlines
policy insights. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Bright Side of Wholesale Funding
2.1 Model
We start by outlining a version of the Calomiris and Kahn (1991) model, which we use
to describe a benchmark "bright side" of bank wholesale funding. Consider an economy
consisting of a bank (with access to an investment project) and two types of ￿nanciers:
retail and wholesale. There are three dates (0;1;2), no discounting, and everyone is
risk-neutral.
The project A bank has exclusive access to a pro￿table but risky long-term project.
For each unit invested at date 0, at date 2 the project returns X with probability p or
0 with probability 1 ￿ p, with a positive net present value: Xp > 1. The project may
also be liquidated at date 1 returning L < 1 per unit initially invested. The maximum
investment size is 1.13
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bank and the wholesale ￿nancier are the socially optimal ones.
2.2 Retail deposits only
Consider a bank funded by retail deposits only. The initial investment D is lower
than the maximum possible investment size of 1; such spare capacity is ine¢ cient,
because the bank￿ s project has a positive net present value. Furthermore, the bank
always continues until date 2: the bank prefers continuation, while retail depositors are
uninformed and passive. This means that bad projects are not terminated at date 1 (to
preserve liquidation value L) but continue until date 2, returning 0. This is the second
source of ine¢ ciency. The monetary value of social welfare when the bank is ￿nanced
with retail deposits only is:
￿Dep = D(pX ￿ 1): (2)
2.3 Wholesale funds: Welfare maximization
Now consider a bank that also uses W of wholesale funds. In this section, we derive the
socially optimal monitoring and continuation decisions of the wholesale ￿nancier and
the amount of wholesale funds attracted by a bank.
Consider ￿rst the continuation decision. If monitoring produces precise information
on date 2 project return, a good bank should be re￿nanced at date 1 (X > L) while a
bad one should be liquidated (L > 0). When monitoring yields no information, so that
project quality is unknown, a bank should be re￿nanced, since Xp > L.
The optimal intensity of monitoring, m￿, and the optimal use of wholesale funds,
W￿, are obtained by maximizing the monetary value of social welfare:
￿ = (D + W)(pX + m(1 ￿ p)L ￿ 1) ￿ C(m): (3)
This yields the maximum possible amount of wholesale funds, so that the complete16
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initial investment 1 is undertaken:
W￿ = 1 ￿ D;
and m￿ given by:
C0(m￿) = (1 ￿ p)L: (4)
Comparing (2) and (3) highlights the bene￿cial e⁄ects of the use of wholesale funds:
higher investment volume D + W = 1 instead of D, and the preservation of some bad
banks￿liquidation value m￿(1 ￿ p)L at the cost of monitoring C(m￿).
2.4 Wholesale funds: Private equilibrium
We now study the private choices of the wholesale ￿nancier and the bank, and compare
the choices with the social optimum.
Wholesale ￿nancier Between dates 0 and 1, the wholesale ￿nancier chooses the
intensity of monitoring, and then observes the outcome of his monitoring. Then, at date
1, he chooses whether to re￿nance or liquidate the bank. The ￿nancier￿ s continuation
decision is in line with the social optimum: when monitoring yields precise information
on project quality, he has incentives to re￿nance a good bank (WR > sL(D +W)) and
liquidate a bad one (sL(D + W) > 0). When monitoring yields no information, the
wholesale ￿nancier rolls over funding, since, by (1), pWR > sL(D + W).
In choosing the intensity of monitoring m, the ￿nancier maximizes:
￿W = pWR + m(1 ￿ p)sL(D + W) ￿ C(m);
which obtains the private choice of mW, given by:
C0(mW) = (1 ￿ p)sL(D + W): (5)17
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s = s￿, m = m￿, and only a bank known by the wholesale ￿nancier to be a bad one is
liquidated.
3 The Dark Side of Wholesale Funding
We now turn to the analysis of the "dark side" of bank wholesale funding. In this section
we show how a plausible change to the "bright side" CK-style setup of Section 2 can
signi￿cantly alter its results.
We introduce an additional source of information: a free but noisy public signal on
date 2 project realization, which the wholesale ￿nancier receives prior to date 1 but
after he has made a decision on the intensity of monitoring. The wholesale ￿nancier
can use this signal when his own monitoring yields no information (either because of
the low intensity of monitoring or merely by bad luck). Although the signal is free, it is
complex, and therefore not received by retail depositors.
We specify the signal to have the same distribution of outcomes as that of the
underlying project. It takes two values: "positive" or "negative" and is characterized
by a precision parameter ￿ (0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1; ￿ = 0 for complete noise and ￿ = 1 for precise
information). The probability of receiving a positive signal is p (the same as that for X
at date 2). Conditional on this, the probability of getting X at date 2 is [p + ￿(1 ￿ p)],
and that of getting 0 is [(1 ￿ p) ￿ ￿(1 ￿ p)]. The probability of a negative signal is 1￿p.
Conditional on this, the probability of getting X at date 2 is [p ￿ ￿p], and that of getting
0 is [(1 ￿ p) + ￿p].
We show that such a relatively minor twist can generate outcomes contrasting to
those of the CK-style setup. Previously, the wholesale ￿nancier always re￿nanced the
bank at date 1 if his private monitoring yielded no information. That was consistent
with both his private incentives and welfare maximization. Now, with the introduction
of the signal described above, the wholesale ￿nancier has lower incentives to monitor
and excess incentives to liquidate the bank based on noisy public information.19
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3.1 Welfare maximization
We start by outlining the benchmark socially optimal decisions on monitoring, re￿nanc-
ing, and the use of wholesale funds in the presence of a free but noisy signal on bank
project quality.
Re￿nancing at date 1 When the wholesale ￿nancier￿ s monitoring before date 1
produces precise information on project quality, the noisy public signal cannot add
information. As before, a good bank will be re￿nanced and a bad one, liquidated.
Without the noisy signal, continuation at date 1 is always optimal when private
monitoring produces no information on project quality. The noisy signal re￿nes date 1
expectations of date 2 project outcome. When a noisy signal is positive, the posterior
of date 2 project success increases to p + ￿(1 ￿ p), so it naturally remains optimal
that the bank is re￿nanced at date 1. However, when a noisy signal is negative, the
posterior of project success falls to [p ￿ ￿p], and the optimal continuation decision starts
to depend on the signal￿ s precision, ￿. If the precision is low so that [p ￿ ￿p]pX ￿ L,
it remains optimal to re￿nance the bank. However, if precision is high enough so that
[p ￿ ￿p]pX < L, it becomes socially optimal to liquidate the bank based solely on a
noisy signal. The threshold value of ￿ is:




Monitoring Now consider how the noisy signal a⁄ects the optimal intensity of moni-
toring and the amount of wholesale funding. Recall that, when the precision of the signal
is low, ￿ ￿ ￿￿, it is optimal to disregard it. The maximization problem is the same as in
the benchmark case (3); the optimal amount of wholesale funding is W￿ = 1 ￿ D and
the optimal monitoring intensity is m￿ given in (4).
When the precision of the noisy signal is high, ￿ > ￿￿, it is optimal to use it and20
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liquidate the bank when the signal is negative. The monetary value of social welfare is:
￿Liq = (D + W)(m[pX + (1 ￿ p)L] + (1 ￿ m)[p[p + ￿(1 ￿ p)]X + (1 ￿ p)L] ￿ 1)￿C(m):
(9)
The term m[pX + (1 ￿ p)L] re￿ ects the payo⁄ from private monitoring that pro-
duces precise information on project quality. The term (1￿m)[p[p + ￿(1 ￿ p)]X + (1 ￿ p)L]
is novel. It represents the payo⁄ from using the noisy signal when private monitoring
produces no information and liquidating the bank upon a negative signal: p is the prob-
ability of a positive signal conditional on which the bank is re￿nanced and yields X with
probability [p + ￿(1 ￿ p)]; (1 ￿ p) is the probability of a negative signal conditional on
which the bank is liquidated to preserve L.
As before, the social welfare (9) is increasing in W, so that it is optimal to use as
much wholesale funding as possible: W￿
Liq = 1 ￿ D = W￿. The optimal intensity of
monitoring m￿
Liq is given by:
C0(m￿
Liq) = p(1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ￿)X: (10)
Observe that m￿
Liq < m￿. This is easy to verify by applying the condition for using the
noisy signal [p ￿ ￿p]pX < L to (4) and (10). The intuition is that the availability of a
free but noisy signal makes the private information obtained through costly monitoring
less valuable.
3.2 Incentives of the wholesale ￿nancier
Now consider the private choices of the wholesale ￿nancier on (1) whether to liquidate
or re￿nance the bank at date 1 and (2) how intensively to monitor the bank prior to
date 1.
Ine¢ cient liquidations As before, when monitoring yields precise information on
the quality of the bank project, the wholesale ￿nancier has incentives to follow its21
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Socially optimal seniority of wholesale funds Based on the incentives of the
wholesale ￿nancier identi￿ed in Lemma 2, we can now formulate in Proposition 2 the
socially optimal seniority and use of wholesale funds.
Proposition 2 Consider the case with possible welfare-reducing liquidations: ￿W
s=1 <
￿ ￿ ￿￿. The socially optimal creditor seniority of the wholesale ￿nancier is s = sW,
sW < 1. Setting s = sW aligns the continuation decision of the wholesale ￿nancier
with the social optimum, and there are no ine¢ cient liquidations. It also maximizes
the intensity of monitoring, albeit at a level below the social optimum: mW(sW) < m￿.
All else equal, the incentives of the wholesale ￿nancier for ine¢ cient liquidations are
higher, and hence the socially optimal seniority of wholesale funding is lower, when the
precision of the public signal ￿ is higher, the bank￿ s liquidation value L is higher, and
there are more deposits D serving as bu⁄er for wholesale funds￿exit.
Point sW can be thought of as the highest seniority consistent with the "bright side"
of wholesale funding. For s > sW, the wholesale ￿nancier becomes su¢ ciently senior
to undertake ine¢ cient liquidations of banks based on overly noisy public information,
and higher seniority leads to lower monitoring.
3.3 Incentives of the bank
The previous section has established the socially optimal seniority of the wholesale
￿nancier: an intermediate sW. However, in practice the decision on creditor seniority is
taken by a bank with the objective of maximizing its private surplus. We now study the
bank￿ s choice of creditor seniority and show that it can deviate from the social optimum.
The bank￿ s choice of creditor seniority for the wholesale ￿nancier The bank
has no incentives to assign creditor seniority below the socially optimal level, because
for s < sW its surplus ￿B given in (6) increases in s.
Consider, however, the private incentives for the bank to assign too high creditor
seniority, s > sW. The bank￿ s cost is similar to the social one: losses when good projects24
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are abandoned in ine¢ cient liquidations. However, the bank also has a private bene￿t:
o⁄ering the wholesale ￿nancier higher seniority reduces the interest rate R. Since the
interest rate on deposits RD is ￿xed, this leads to an increase in the bank￿ s surplus. If
the net e⁄ect is positive (lower interest expense compensates the higher risk of ine¢ cient
liquidations), the bank has private incentives to o⁄er too high seniority.
Indeed, recall that the bank￿ s surplus at sW is:
￿B
s=sW = p[D(X ￿ RD) + W(X ￿ Rs=sW)] (17)
with R given by (7).




p ￿ (1 ￿ mW
Liq)p(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ p)
￿
[D(X ￿ RD) + W(X ￿ RLiq)] (18)
with RLiq given by (16). (Note immediately that ￿B
Liq increases in W, so that the bank
chooses socially optimal W = 1 ￿ D.) It is instructive to compare the two expressions
above. Observe that in ￿B
Liq the ￿rst multiplicative term features a lower probability of
bank project success than that in ￿B
s=sW; the di⁄erence is the probability (1￿mW
Liq)p(1￿
￿)(1￿p) of ine¢ cient liquidations. The second term ￿the bank￿ s surplus conditional on
project success, at the same time, is higher in ￿B
Liq than in ￿B
s=sW, since RLiq < Rs=sW
due to higher s. Indeed, consider the bank￿ s surplus as a function of s. Early liquidations
trigger a discrete drop in ￿B at sW. The value of that decline is:
￿B
s=sW ￿ ￿B
Liq;s=sW = (1 ￿ mW
Liq)p(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ p)[D(X ￿ RD) + W(X ￿ R)]: (19)
However, after the initial drop, ￿B
s>sW may start increasing in s.













p ￿ (1 ￿ mW
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The ￿rst term on the right-hand side represents the impact of higher seniority on
monitoring and is negative, dmLiq=ds < 0, since with higher s the wholesale ￿nancier
monitors the bank less, resulting in more ine¢ cient liquidations. However, the second
term is positive, ￿dRLiq=ds > 0, since with higher s the bank pays a lower interest rate
on wholesale funding (the wholesale ￿nancier is compensated more in early liquidations
instead). Therefore, the overall e⁄ect of higher s on ￿B
Liq is ambiguous.
The full analytical examination of ￿B
Liq is complicated by the fact that its convexity
depends on the shape of C(m), including the third derivative. Since the shape of C(m) is
not at the core of our argument, we make a simplifying restriction to focus the exposition
on the e⁄ects that we want to highlight. Speci￿cally, we consider a very well-behaved
C(m), such that m is e⁄ectively constant, m = mC, in the relevant range of parameter
values. This corresponds to C(m) having a sharp J-shape that is almost horizontal
until mC and almost vertical after that. Figure 2 depicts possible shapes of ￿B
Liq that
are allowed or ruled out by this simpli￿cation, to help us understand the dimensions of
generality we are preserving or losing.
The key impact of the restriction is that the ￿rst term in (20) becomes zero, while
the second term becomes a constant. We therefore are left with a linear and increasing
￿B
Liq, so that the global maximum of ￿B is achieved in either s = sW when ￿￿B =
￿B
Liq;s=1 ￿ ￿B
s=sW is positive, or s = 1 otherwise. From (17) and (18),
￿￿B = p[Rs=sW ￿ RLiq;s=1]W￿(1￿mC)p(1￿￿)(1￿p)[D(X ￿ RD) + W(X ￿ RLiq;s=1)]:
The ￿rst term above re￿ ects a lower interest expense for more senior wholesale funds,
while the second term re￿ ects the probability of ine¢ cient liquidations.
We examine cross-sectional properties of ￿￿B with respect to four key parameters
of the model: ￿, L, D, and W, and summarize the ￿ndings in Lemma 3:
Lemma 3 ￿￿B increases in ￿ and L; it increases in D and decreases in W.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition is that, higher ￿ , L, and D reduce the cost of early liquidations26
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for the wholesale ￿nancier, which translates into a lower interest rate charged by him
and accordingly higher surplus for the bank. Higher W has the opposite e⁄ect since
W = 1 ￿ D
We then conduct a simple numerical exercise, to demonstrate how, within a plausible
range of parameter values, ￿￿B can be either positive or negative. The exercise validates
the existence of both "bright" and "dark" sides of wholesale funding. The outcome of
the exercise is illustrated in Figure 3.4
Based on Lemma 3 and the numerical analysis, we can now summarize in Proposition
3 the bank￿ s incentives of assigning too high seniority to wholesale funds despite the risk
of ine¢ cient liquidations:
Proposition 3 The "dark side" of wholesale funding exists: the set of parameter values
for which the bank assigns the wholesale ￿nancier too high seniority, subjecting itself to
the risk of ine¢ cient liquidations, is non-empty. All else equal, the bank has higher
incentives to assign too high seniority to the wholesale ￿nancier when the precision of
the public signal ￿ is higher, the bank￿ s liquidation value L is higher, and there are more
deposits D serving as bu⁄er for wholesale funds￿exit.
4 Discussion
This section discusses some features of our model and brie￿ y outlines policy insights.
Comparative statics Propositions 2 and 3 o⁄er cross-sectional predictions on the risk
of ine¢ cient liquidations in di⁄erent types of banks. They identify that banks are more
likely to assign too high seniority to wholesale funds, and wholesale ￿nanciers are more
likely to undertake ine¢ cient liquidations, when the precision of the public signal on bank
project quality ￿ and the bank￿ s liquidation value L are higher. These two predictions
4The simulation is based on the following parameter values: m = 0:5; ￿ = 1; p = 0:90; X = 1:15;
RD = 1:10. W takes the values of 0:25, 0:5, and 0:75, respectively, in three di⁄erent scenarios. We
have considered alternative speci￿cations, and con￿rmed that the properties revealed by the ￿gures are
robust to choosing other parameter values.
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practice, this would likely correspond to taxing the use of short-term wholesale funds
such as collateralized repo￿ s, because short maturity and over-collateralization are good
proxies for higher e⁄ective seniority.
This tax shares intuition with the systemic risk tax proposed in Acharya et al.
(2010), in that both attempt to cause banks to internalize the negative externality that
their actions impose on the rest of the ￿nancial system. The proposal of Acharya et al.
is broader. It targets not just one risk factor but overall systemic risk and is therefore
more comprehensive and able to capture future sources of vulnerability.
5 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the "dark side" of bank wholesale funding ￿insu¢ cient monitoring
and ine¢ cient liquidations of banks by short-term wholesale ￿nanciers. The model
suggests that wholesale funds can indeed be bene￿cially used in "traditional" banks
that hold mostly opaque and non-tradable relationship loans. In contrast, these funds
can create signi￿cant risks in "modern" banks that hold mostly arm￿ s length assets with
readily available, but noisy, public signals on their values.29
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A Proofs
Lemma 1 Recall that:
￿B = p[D(X ￿ RD) + W(X ￿ R)];
and:
R =
W￿ + C(mW) ￿ mW(1 ￿ p)sL(D + W)
Wp
:

























(1 ￿ p)sL(D + W)
Substituting gives:30
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Liq;s=sW) ￿ (1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ￿)WpRLiq;s=sW
mW
Liq;s=sWWp + (1 ￿ mW







Liq;s=sW(1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ￿)
i:













Lemma 3 Consider ￿￿B; recall we established that a bank always chooses W = 1￿D,
so that:
￿￿B = pW [Rs=sW ￿ RLiq;s=1]￿(1￿mC)p(1￿￿)(1￿p)[(1 ￿ W)(X ￿ RD) + W(X ￿ RLiq;s=1)]:
Substitute expressions for Rs=sW and RLiq;s=1 (using m = mC and C(mC) = 0):
Rs=sW =
W￿
Wp(1 + mC(1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ￿))
RLiq;s=1 =
W￿ + C(mC) ￿ (1 ￿ p)L
Wp[mC + (1 ￿ mC)[p + ￿(1 ￿ p)]]
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1 + mC(1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
W￿ ￿ (1 ￿ p)L
mC + (1 ￿ mC)[p + ￿(1 ￿ p)]
￿
￿
￿(1 ￿ mC)p(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ p)
￿
X ￿ (1 ￿ W)RD ￿ W
W￿ ￿ (1 ￿ p)L
Wp[mC + (1 ￿ mC)[p + ￿(1 ￿ p)]]
￿
:
We can now establish the signs of the ￿rst derivatives.
3a. Note immediately that d￿￿B=dL > 0:
3b. Note that the ￿rst term of ￿￿Bincreases in ￿: Rs=sW increases in ￿ while
RLiq;s=1 decreases in ￿.
In the second term, the ￿rst multiplier (probability of incorrect liquidation) decreases
in ￿, while the second multiplier (surplus lost in incorrect liquidations) increases because




(1 ￿ mC)p(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ p)
￿
W
W￿ ￿ (1 ￿ p)L
Wp[mC + (1 ￿ mC)[p + ￿(1 ￿ p)]]
￿￿
=
[W￿ ￿ (1 ￿ p)L](1 ￿ mC)(1 ￿ p)
[mC + (1 ￿ mC)[p + ￿(1 ￿ p)]]
2 > 0:
Therefore both terms increase in ￿ and d￿￿=d￿ > 0.
3c-d. We examine d￿￿B=dW; d￿￿B=dD is inverse since a bank chooses W = 1￿D.





1 + mC(1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
W￿ ￿ (1 ￿ p)L
mC + (1 ￿ mC)[p + ￿(1 ￿ p)]
￿
= ￿￿
(1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ￿)
(mC + (1 ￿ mC)[p + ￿(1 ￿ p)])(1 + mC(1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ￿))
< 0:
In the second term, two factors a⁄ect the bank￿ s loss in incorrect liquidations. First,
RLiq decreases in W and therefore increases the bank￿ s surplus. Second, the shift from34
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The wholesale financier’s monitoring and liquidation decisions. 
 
The left panel illustrates the benchmark case without a noisy public signal: the wholesale 
financier’s intensity of monitoring m increases monotonically in his creditor seniority s. The 
right panel depicts the case with a noisy signal. There, when seniority exceeds the threshold 
value s=s




Without a noisy signal                     With a noisy signal 
 
 
s  1 
m 
m* 
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 The bank’s surplus depending on the wholesale financier’s seniority.  
 
The figures depict the bank's surplus Π
B as a function of the wholesale financier’s creditor 
seniority s. The left panel shows the bank's surplus in the benchmark case without a noisy 
signal. The right panel shows the case with the noisy signal. There, the continuous lines and 
the shaded area between them represent shapes complying with the m=mC assumption (all 
linear), while the broken lines represent examples of shapes ruled out by that assumption. 
The point s
W is the threshold beyond which the wholesale financier liquidates a bank based 
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Figure 3.  
 
The bright and dark sides of bank wholesale funding. 
 
Line 1 represents pairs of signal precision θ and liquidation value L that satisfy ΔΠ
B=0. All 
points below that line satisfy ΔΠ
B≥0 so that the bank has the incentive to assign socially 
optimal seniority s
W to the wholesale financier, corresponding to the “bright side” of 
wholesale funding. All points above that line satisfy ΔΠ
B<0 so that the bank has the incentive 
to assign too high seniority s=1 to wholesale funds, corresponding to the "dark side."  
 
The other lines represent additional parameter restrictions used in the model. Line 2 is 
θ>θ
W
s=1 (existence of inefficient liquidations; indistinguishable from line 1 in the middle 
graph). Line 3 is θ<θ
* (early liquidations based on noisy signals are not socially optimal). 



























Low use of wholesale funding, 
W=0.25 
Intermediate use of 
wholesale funding, W=0.50
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